The Impact of Family Representation on CEO Compensation

被引：83

作者：

Combs, James G. ^{[1
]}

Penney, Christopher R. ^{[2
]}

Crook, T. Russell ^{[3
]}

Short, Jeremy C. ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Florida State Univ, Coll Business, Jim Moran Inst Global Entrepreneurship, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA

[2] Florida State Univ, Coll Business, Dept Management, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA

[3] Univ Tennessee, Coll Business Adm, Knoxville, TN USA

[4] Texas Tech Univ, Jerry S Rawls Coll Business Adm, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA

来源：

ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE | 2010年 / 34卷 / 06期

关键词：

EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; STOCK-OPTIONS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; BOARD COMPOSITION; AGENCY PROBLEMS; FIRMS; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; MATTER; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00417.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Understanding the nature of family representation in public firms has been an important topic for entrepreneurship research. Because CEO compensation is a key tool that boards use to align the interests of shareholders and managers, researchers have taken steps toward understanding how family representation affects CEO compensation. Prior research has painted family-member CEOs as stewards who accept lower compensation. Based on agency theory, we describe a different scenario wherein family representatives engage in strategic control that reduces family-member CEOs' compensation. Thus, family-member CEOs accept lower compensation only when additional family members are represented in management or on the board. In comparison with CEOs at nonfamily firms, we find that family-member CEO compensation is 13% lower when multiple family members are involved, but 56% higher when the CEO is the lone family member.

引用

页码：1125 / 1144

页数：20

共 60 条

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