Modeling the democratic peace as a Kantian selection process

被引:39
作者
Cederman, LE [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1177/0022002701045004004
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Computational modeling is used to improve our understanding of how the democratic peace unfolds as a historical process in time and space. Whereas most of the conventional literature interprets the phenomenon as a constant and universal law operating at the state level, the author follows Immanuel Kant and treats democratic cooperation as an emergent macroprocess. The current study explores three causal mechanisms. First, strategic tagging introduces a way for democracies to select out like-minded cooperators. Second, regime-sensitive alliances enable democratic states to defend the gains of cooperation. Third, liberal collective security complements the liberal alignments. Based on these processes, it is possible to "grow" cooperative outcomes in an inhospitable geopolitical environment. Because tagging alone is insufficient, alliances, and sometimes even collective security, are necessary to produce perpetual peace. Such outcomes are characterized by high levels of spatial clustering.
引用
收藏
页码:470 / 502
页数:33
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