Towards a Social Theory of Agency

被引:166
作者
Wiseman, Robert M. [1 ]
Cuevas-Rodriguez, Gloria
Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.
机构
[1] Michigan State Univ, Eli Broad Grad Sch Management, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
关键词
agency theory; corporate governance; principal-agent relations; social context; FAMILY-CONTROLLED FIRMS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CEO PAY; CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; UNITED-STATES; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; RISK; DIRECTORS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-6486.2011.01016.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We challenge critics of agency theory who suggest that agency theory's value does not extend outside a narrow context dominated by egocentric agents seeking only to maximize wealth at the expense of the principal. Instead, we argue that agency theory's flexibility allows for its application to a variety of non-traditional settings where the key elements of agency theory, such as self-interest, information asymmetry, and the mechanisms used to control agency costs can vary beyond the narrow assumptions implied in traditional agency-based research. We suggest that extending agency theory to diverse settings using a deductive approach can be accomplished by formally recognizing and incorporating the institutional context surrounding principalagent (PA) relations into agency-based models. Thus, criticisms that agency theory fails to acknowledge the social context in which PA relations occur provides not a barrier but an opportunity for extending our understanding of PA relations to a variety of diverse contexts.
引用
收藏
页码:202 / 222
页数:21
相关论文
共 122 条
[1]   Comparative and International Corporate Governance [J].
Aguilera, Ruth V. ;
Jackson, Gregory .
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT ANNALS, 2010, 4 :485-556
[2]   The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants [J].
Aguilera, RV ;
Jackson, G .
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 2003, 28 (03) :447-465
[3]  
[Anonymous], COMPENSATION BENEFIT
[4]  
[Anonymous], WORLD WORK J SCOTTSD
[5]  
[Anonymous], WALL STREET J 0608
[6]  
[Anonymous], STRUCUTRE CHANGE EC
[7]  
[Anonymous], COMPENSATION ORG STR
[8]  
[Anonymous], RES ORG BEHAV
[9]  
[Anonymous], 2011, INNOVATION PRESERVAT
[10]  
[Anonymous], J MANAGEMENT STUDIES