The double-edged sword of legitimacy in base-of-the-pyramid markets

被引:123
作者
Kistruck, Geoffrey M. [1 ]
Webb, Justin W. [2 ]
Sutter, Christopher J. [3 ]
Bailey, Anastasia V. G. [4 ]
机构
[1] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, Dept Entrepreneurship, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[2] Oklahoma State Univ, Spears Sch Business, Dept Entrepreneurship, Stillwater, OK 74078 USA
[3] Miami Univ, Farmer Sch Business, Dept Entrepreneurship, Oxford, OH 45056 USA
[4] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Dept Management & Human Resources, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
Base-of-the-pyramid markets; Legitimacy; Informal economy; Informal markets; Informal entrepreneurship; Institutional voids; Weak institutions; Institutional heterogeneity; Crime; Illegitimate orders; DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; LIKERT SCALE; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; INSTITUTIONS; GROWTH; MODEL; VANDALISM; RESPONSES; STRATEGIES; EFFICIENCY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusvent.2014.06.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
As compared to developed countries, a much higher proportion of entrepreneurs within base-of-the-pyramid (BOP) markets operate unregistered businesses. Prior research has suggested that the primacy cause of such informal activity in these settings is the general failure of 'weak' institutions to provide sufficient resources to warrant formalization. We attempt to extend such thinking by deconstructing the discrete and inter-related effects of formal business registration on the level of resources obtained by entrepreneurs from financial, labor, and legal institutions within BOP markets. Using a multi-method approach involving 299 entrepreneurs within Guatemala City, our results suggest that being seen as a 'legitimate', registered business can actually lead to both increased resource provision and resource appropriation. More specifically, adhering to the norms and rules prescribed by regulatory institutions within weak legal environments can convey positive signals of stability and profitability that both attract the desired attention from formal institutional actors, as well as unwanted attention from criminals. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:436 / 451
页数:16
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