Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

被引:23
作者
Dagan, N [1 ]
Volij, O [1 ]
机构
[1] BROWN UNIV,DEPT ECON,PROVIDENCE,RI 02912
关键词
Economic Theory; Game Theory; Binary Relation; Division Rule; Fair Division;
D O I
10.1007/BF01262509
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.
引用
收藏
页码:11 / 25
页数:15
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