A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule

被引：25

作者：

Ratliff, TC ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Wheaton Coll, Dept Math, Norton, MA 02766 USA

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2001年 / 18卷 / 01期

关键词：

Condorcet Winner; Geometric Technique; Transitive Ranking;

D O I：

10.1007/s003550000060

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In an election without a Condorcet winner, Dodgson's method is designed to find the candidate that is "closest" to being a Condorcet winner. Similarly, if the head-to-head elections among all candidates do not give a complete transitive ranking, then Kemeny's Rule finds the '"closest" transitive ranking. This paper uses geometric techniques to compare Dodgson's and Kemeny's notions of closeness and explain how conflict can arise between the two methods.

引用

页码：79 / 89

页数：11