Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information

被引：36

作者：

Bessen, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2004年 / 82卷 / 03期

关键词：

patents; licensing; innovation; intellectual property;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2003.08.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

When innovation is cumulative, early patentees can hold up later innovators. Under complete information, licensing before R&D avoids holdup. But when development costs are private information, ex ante licensing may only occur in regimes with sub-optimal patent policy. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：321 / 326

页数：6

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