Elite cues and citizen disagreement with expert opinion

被引:53
作者
Darmofal, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ S Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1177/106591290505800302
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Though scholars have long been concerned about the quality of citizens' political decision making, we still know little about why citizens disagree with the best-informed opinion in society, that of public policy experts. In this article, I examine the factors that lead citizens to disagree with expert opinion on questions of public policy I find that both elite cues and individual-level attributes of citizens lead individuals to disagree with experts. In contrast to the expectations of many recent studies of cue taking, I find that citizens are more likely to disagree with expert opinion when political elites they favor challenge this opinion. Citizens also disagree with experts as a consequence of low levels of knowledge, existing policy preferences, and life experiences. The study's results challenge the optimistic conclusions of many recent studies of cue taking and argue that there is significant value in the conventional wisdom that preceded these studies. Elite cues are not a consistent means to effective policy judgments. Instead, when it comes to reaching effective policy decisions, there is no substitute for knowledge.
引用
收藏
页码:381 / 395
页数:15
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