Preemptive strike - Central bank reform in chile's transition from authoritarian rule

被引:17
作者
Boylan, DM [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/422333
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Under what conditions do exiting autoritarian elites use institutions to fend off the threat of democracy? One way to execute institutional insulation is to make the central bank autonomous from elected officials. Central bank autonomy both removes a key aspect of economic decision making from democratic control and constrains governments to pursue neoliberal policies. Where authoritarian elites know a regime change is imminent and fear a populist outcome, as in Chile in 1989, they can be expected to create an autonomous central bank to tie the hands of successor governments.
引用
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页码:443 / +
页数:21
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