Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

被引:114
作者
Oechssler, J
Riedel, F
机构
[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[2] Humboldt Univ, Dept Econ, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
关键词
replicator dynamics; evolutionary stability; continuous strategy spaces;
D O I
10.1007/PL00004092
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this unsatisfying restriction is unnecessary, We specify a simple condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for the case of infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide new conditions for the stability of rest points and show that even strict equilibria may be unstable. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, linear-quadratic games, the harvest preemption game, and games with mixed strategies.
引用
收藏
页码:141 / 162
页数:22
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