International 'standards' and international governance

被引:113
作者
Abbott, KW
Snidal, D
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Sch Law, Chicago, IL 60611 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Dept Polit Sci, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
externality; governance; institutional analysis; international law; private rule-making; standards;
D O I
10.1080/13501760110056013
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
'Standards' are central mechanisms of international governance, but have different roles in various circumstances. These can be analyzed in terms of a simple typology. One key distinction is analytic: contrasting the Prisoners' Dilemma structure of traditional Pigovian externalities with the Coordination structure of network externalities. The second distinction is substantive: contrasting physical or technological externalities with externalities that arise in the creation of public policy. The four resulting circumstances are typically addressed by alternative governance arrangements: varying combinations of private and public governance - according to the respective interests and competencies of the two spheres - and varying levels of governance - national, regional or global - according to the scope of the problem and the capacity of institutions. Our analysis of these choices is primarily positive, but the comparative institutional framework we develop is equally useful for addressing the associated normative question - how should international standards be set?.
引用
收藏
页码:345 / 370
页数:26
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