A dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation

被引：28

作者：

Cellini, R ^{[1
]}

Lambertini, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bologna, Dipartimento Sci Econ, I-40126 Bologna, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1998年 / 83卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1998.2454

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation. We prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem, or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone. In the latter case, the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, as well as social planning. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications Numbers: C73, L13. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

引用

页码：145 / 155

页数：11

共 17 条

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