Self-fulfilling early-contracting rush

被引:14
作者
Li, H
Suen, W
机构
[1] Univ Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00127.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In markets for entry-level professionals, the insurance motive drives some participants to sign early contracts. The rush to early contracting can be self-fulfilling, as both its effect on expectations about demand-supply balance in the subsequent spot market and the effect on it from changes in the demand-supply balance can be nonmonotone. Matching markets with more risk-averse participants, a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply of positions, or a more polarized distribution of applicant qualities are more vulnerable to self-fulfilling early-contracting rushes. Employers can have a collective interest in preventing early offers to a few promising applicants from starting the rushes.
引用
收藏
页码:301 / 324
页数:24
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