The replicator dynamics with n players and population structure

被引:45
作者
van Veelen, Matthijs [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, CREED, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
Hamilton's rule; Inclusive fitness; Group selection; Replicator dynamics; Generalized equal gains from switching; GROUP SELECTION; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; STABLE STRATEGIES; INCLUSIVE FITNESS; COOPERATION; RULE; ALTRUISM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.01.044
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
The well-known replicator dynamics is usually applied to 2-player games and random matching. Here we allow for games with n players, and for population structures other than random matching. This more general application leads to a version of the replicator dynamics of which the standard 2-player, well-mixed version is a special case, and which allows us to explore the dynamic implications of population structure. The replicator dynamics also allows for a reformulation of the central theorem in Van Veelen (2009), which claims that inclusive fitness gives the correct prediction for games with generalized equal gains from switching (or, in other words, when fitness effects are additive). If we furthermore also assume that relatedness is constant during selection - which is a reasonable assumption in a setting with kin recognition - then inclusive fitness even becomes a parameter that determines the speed as well as the direction of selection. For games with unequal gains from switching, inclusive fitness can give the wrong prediction. With equal gains however, not only the sign, but also even the value of inclusive fitness becomes meaningful. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:78 / 85
页数:8
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