Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?

被引：823

作者：

Hall, BJ ^{[1
]}

Liebman, JB

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 113卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/003355398555702

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest, publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In addition, we show that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely because of increases in stock option grants.

引用

页码：653 / 691

页数：39

共 35 条

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