Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy

被引:66
作者
Orphanides, A
Williams, JC
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 94105 USA
[2] Fed Reserve Board, Washington, DC 20551 USA
关键词
inflation forecasts; policy rules; rational expectations; learning;
D O I
10.1016/j.red.2005.01.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Central bankers frequently emphasize the critical importance of anchoring private inflation expectations for successful monetary policy and macroeconomic stabilization. In most monetary policy models, however, expectations are already anchored through the assumption of rational expectations and perfect knowledge of the economy. In this paper, we reexamine the role of inflation expectations by positing, instead, that agents have imperfect knowledge of the precise structure of the economy and policymakers' preferences, and rely on a perpetual learning technology to form expectations. We find that with learning, disturbances can give rise to endogenous inflation scares, that is, significant and persistent deviations of inflation expectations from those implied by rational expectations, even at long horizons. The presence of learning increases the sensitivity of inflation expectations and the term structure of interest rates to economic shocks, in line with the empirical evidence. We also explore the role of private inflation expectations for the conduct of efficient monetary policy. Under rational expectations, inflation expectations equal a linear combination of macroeconomic variables and as such provide no additional information to the policy maker. In contrast, under learning, private inflation expectations follow a time-varying process and provide useful information for the conduct of monetary policy. Published by Elsevier Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:498 / 527
页数:30
相关论文
共 38 条
[1]  
BEECHEY M, 2004, UNPUB LEARNING TERM
[2]   Inflation forecasts and monetary policy [J].
Bernanke, BS ;
Woodford, M .
JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 1997, 29 (04) :653-684
[3]  
BOMFIM A, 1997, MONETARY POLICY INFL
[4]   Learning about monetary policy rules [J].
Bullard, J ;
Mitra, K .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 2002, 49 (06) :1105-1129
[5]   YIELD SPREADS AND INTEREST-RATE MOVEMENTS - A BIRDS-EYE-VIEW [J].
CAMPBELL, JY ;
SHILLER, RJ .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1991, 58 (03) :495-514
[6]  
CHRISTIANO LJ, 2001, 8403 NBER
[7]   Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability:: Evidence and some theory [J].
Clarida, R ;
Galí, J ;
Gertler, M .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2000, 115 (01) :147-180
[8]   Optimal monetary policy rules in a rational expectations model of the Phillips curve [J].
Clark, PB ;
Goodhart, CAE ;
Huang, HZ .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1999, 43 (02) :497-520
[9]  
COGLEY T, 2002, UNPUB EXPLORATION EV
[10]   THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL-FUNDS RATE TARGET ON MARKET INTEREST-RATES IN THE 1970S [J].
COOK, T ;
HAHN, T .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1989, 24 (03) :331-351