The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting

被引：84

作者：

Felsenthal, DS

Machover, M

机构：

[1] Univ Haifa, IL-31905 Haifa, Israel

[2] Kings Coll London, London WC2R 2LS, England

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2001年 / 18卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s003550100137

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyse and evaluate three decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU? which are prescribed by the 'definitive form' of the Treaty of Nice. The first will apply from 2005 to the present 15-member EU, if it will not have been enlarged by then. The second or third will apply to an enlarged 27-member EU. We conclude that the first of these is an improvement on the current decision rule; but the other two have extremely undesirable features.

引用

页码：431 / 464

页数：34

共 18 条

[1] MULTI-MEMBER ELECTORAL DISTRICTS - DO THEY VIOLATE ONE MAN, ONE VOTE PRINCIPLE
BANZHAF, JF
[J]. YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1966, 75 (08) : 1309 - 1338
[2] BRAEUNINGER T, 1997, INDICES POWER IOP CO
[3] Coleman James S., 1971, social choice, P269
[4] Dubey P., 1979, Mathematics of Operations Research, V4, P99, DOI 10.1287/moor.4.2.99
[5] *EU, 2000, 474500 EU CONFER
[6] *EU, 2000, 53300 SN EU
[7] *EU, 2001, 482000 EU CONFER
[8] The weighted voting rule in the EU's Council of Ministers, 1958-95: Intentions and outcomes
Felsenthal, DS
Machover, M
[J]. ELECTORAL STUDIES, 1997, 16 (01) : 33 - 47
[9] Ternary voting games
Felsenthal, DS
Machover, M
[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1997, 26 (03) : 335 - 351
[10] FELSENTHAL DS, 2000, 0100 VPP LOND SCH EC

← 1 2 →