Expressive law and economics

被引:274
作者
Cooter, R [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/468036
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
This article develops an economic theory of expressive law. By expressing social values, law can tip a system of social norms into a new equilibrium. This process can create or destroy a social norm without changing individual values. In addition, law can change the individual values of rational people. Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences. I call such a commitment a "Pareto self-improvement." By creating opportunities for Pareto self-improvements, law induces rational people to change their preferences. Inducing change in this way respects individual preferences, rather favoring a particular moral theory.
引用
收藏
页码:585 / 608
页数:24
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