How can mental models theory account for content effects in conditional reasoning? A developmental perspective

被引:68
作者
Barrouillet, P [1 ]
Lecas, JF [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bourgogne, LEAD, CNRS ESA 5022, Fac Sci Gabriel, F-21000 Dijon, France
关键词
cognitive development; mental models; reasoning; conditional reasoning;
D O I
10.1016/S0010-0277(98)00037-7
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
This article proposes a modification to Johnson-Laird's mental models theory applied to the interpretation of conditional statement of the form 'if...then'. The model suggests that this interpretation is based on the construction of mental models supplied by establishing a correspondence between the semantic spaces associated with the antecedent and consequent of the statements. The construction of the models and the interpretation of the statements would depend on the nature of the semantic spaces involved, the interpretative context and the subject's knowledge and processing capacity. Three experiments show that the interpretation of conditional rules depends, for example, on whether or not the conditional rule possess binary terms (e.g. boy/girl). The developmental approach makes it possible to reveal phenomena which tend to remain hidden in studies of adult functioning. We show that the model accounts for a number of the reasoning biases described in the literature as well as for the interpretation of various conditional forms which do not have a truth-functional meaning. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:209 / 253
页数:45
相关论文
共 57 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1993, UNDERSTANDING REPRES
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1971, Linguistic inquiry
[3]  
[Anonymous], [No title captured]
[4]  
Barrouillet P, 1997, CAH PSYCHOL COGN, V16, P609
[5]   PROPOSITIONAL REASONING BY MODEL [J].
BONATTI, L .
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1994, 101 (04) :725-733
[6]   WHY SHOULD WE ABANDON THE MENTAL LOGIC HYPOTHESIS [J].
BONATTI, L .
COGNITION, 1994, 50 (1-3) :17-39
[7]  
Braine M. D. S., 1990, REASONING NECESSITY, P135
[8]   PREDICTING INTERMEDIATE AND MULTIPLE CONCLUSIONS IN PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC INFERENCE PROBLEMS - FURTHER EVIDENCE FOR A MENTAL LOGIC [J].
BRAINE, MDS ;
OBRIEN, DP ;
NOVECK, IA ;
SAMUELS, MC ;
LEA, RB ;
FISH, SM ;
YANG, YG .
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL, 1995, 124 (03) :263-292
[9]   A THEORY OF IF - A LEXICAL ENTRY, REASONING PROGRAM, AND PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES [J].
BRAINE, MDS ;
OBRIEN, DP .
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1991, 98 (02) :182-203
[10]   SOME EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR A THEORY OF NATURAL PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC [J].
BRAINE, MDS ;
REISER, BJ ;
RUMAIN, B .
PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION-ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY, 1984, 18 :313-371