What's in a vote? The short- and long-run impact of dual-class equity on IPO firm values

被引:59
作者
Smart, Scott B. [3 ]
Thirumalai, Ramabhadran S. [2 ]
Zutter, Chad J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Katz Grad Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
[2] Indian Sch Business, Hyderabad 500032, Andhra Pradesh, India
[3] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
关键词
initial public offerings; dual class; ownership structure; governance; firm value; CEO turnover;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.07.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that relative to fundamentals, dual-class firms trade at lower prices than do single-class firms, both at the IPO and for at least the subsequent 5 years. The lower prices attached to duals do not foreshadow abnormally low stock or accounting returns. Moreover, some types of CEO turnover are less frequent among duals, and in general CEO turnover is sensitive to firm performance for singles but not for duals. Finally, when duals unify their share classes, statistically and economically significant value gains occur. Collectively, our results suggest that the governance associated with dual-class equity influences the pricing of duals. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:94 / 115
页数:22
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