To pay or to apologize? On the psychology of dealing with unfair offers in a dictator game

被引:56
作者
De Cremer, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Erasmus Univ, Erasmus Ctr Behav Eth, Rotterdam Sch Management, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
关键词
Ultimatum bargaining; Trust repair; Trust game; Apologies; Financial compensations; Gains; Losses; DECISION-MAKING; SOCIAL UTILITY; TRUST; FAIRNESS; JUSTICE; PERSPECTIVES; ATTRIBUTIONS; ORGANIZATION; NEGOTIATION; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Prior research has largely failed to focus on how transgressors can promote trust when having made unfair offers in bargaining I investigated in the context of receiving an unfair offer in a dictator game when financial compensations and when apologies are most effective in motivating trust behavior by the violated party I hypothesized that when losses were allocated the violated party would be motivated to show more trust behavior towards the transgressor when a financial compensation (resulting again in equal final out comes) relative to an apology was delivered whereas when gains were allocated apologies would be more effective in promoting trust behavior than a financial compensation Results from a laboratory study Indeed supported this prediction as such demonstrating the important e of how allocation decisions are framed (i e loss or gain) in testing the effectiveness of trust repair strategies (financial compensations vs apologies) (C) 2010 Elsevier B V All rights reserved
引用
收藏
页码:843 / 848
页数:6
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