DISENABLING LEVY'S FRANKFURT-STYLE ENABLING CASES

被引：8

作者：

Haji, Ishtiyaque ^{[1
]}

McKenna, Michael ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calgary, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada

[2] Univ Arizona, Dept Philosophy, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

来源：

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2011年 / 92卷 / 03期

关键词：

FREEDOM; LIBERTARIANISM; PRINCIPLE; ARGUMENT;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01403.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this paper, we explain why his argument fails.

引用

页码：400 / 414

页数：15

共 38 条

[1] INVOLUNTARY SINS [J].