Pirated for profit

被引：54

作者：

Slive, J ^{[1
]}

Bernhardt, D

机构：

[1] Univ British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V5Z 1M9, Canada

[2] Univ Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USA

[3] Queens Univ, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada

来源：

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 1998年 / 31卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/136498

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper explains why a software manufacturer may permit limited piracy of its software. Piracy can be viewed as a form of price discrimination in which the manufacturer sells some of the software at a price of zero. In the presence of significant network externalities for the software, it may be profit maximizing for the software manufacturer to tolerate piracy by home consumers, most of whom have a low willingness to pay. This can increase the demand for the software by business users. JEL Classification: L2.

引用

页码：886 / 899

页数：14

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