Ownership structure and the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments: Evidence from Korean firms

被引:348
作者
Kim, Hicheon [1 ]
Kim, Heechun [2 ]
Lee, Peggy M. [2 ]
机构
[1] Korea Univ, Business Sch, Seoul 136701, South Korea
[2] Arizona State Univ, WP Carey Sch Business, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
关键词
ownership structure; agency theory; organizational slack; R&D investments;
D O I
10.1287/orsc.1080.0360
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We use agency theory to examine the influence of ownership structure on the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments, highlighting how that relationship might differ depending on the identity of the owners, and their potentially different interests. In doing so, we extend the scope of agency theory by examining the principal-principal conflicts of interests that may exist among different types of owners. Using a sample of Korean manufacturing firms in R&D-intensive industries between 1998 and 2003, we find that financial slack has an inverted U-shaped relationship with R&D investments. Furthermore, that relationship varies depending on the presence of different types of owners. Family ownership positively moderates the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments, whereas domestic institutional investors and foreign investors negatively moderate that relationship. Our results show that distinguishing among different types of owners is instrumental in enhancing our understanding of the nature of the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments.
引用
收藏
页码:404 / 418
页数:15
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