Does Regulatory Supervision Curtail Microfinance Profitability and Outreach?

被引：152

作者：

Cull, Robert ^{[1
]}

Demirguec-Kunt, Asli ^{[1
]}

Morduch, Jonathan ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA

[2] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2011年 / 39卷 / 06期

关键词：

microfinance; regulation; cross-country regression; global; INSTITUTIONS; PERFORMANCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.10.016

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Regulation allows microfinance institutions to take deposits and expand their banking functions, but complying with regulation can be costly. We examine implications for institutions' profitability and their outreach to small-scale borrowers and women, using a newly-constructed dataset on 245 leading institutions. Controlling for the non-random assignment of supervision via treatment effects and instrumental variables regressions, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that profit-oriented microfinance institutions respond to supervision by maintaining profit rates but curtailing outreach to women and customers that are costly to reach. Institutions with a weaker commercial focus instead tend to reduce profitability but maintain outreach. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：949 / 965

页数：17

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