Auction Design for the Private Provision of Public Goods in Developing Countries: Lessons from Payments for Environmental Services in Malawi and Indonesia

被引：52

作者：

Ajayi, Oluyede C. ^{[1
]}

Jack, B. Kelsey ^{[2
]}

Leimona, Beria ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] ICRAF So Africa, Lilongwe, Malawi

[2] Tufts Univ, Medford, MA 02155 USA

[3] ICRAF SE Asia, Bogor, Indonesia

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2012年 / 40卷 / 06期

关键词：

payments for environmental services; cost-effectiveness; auction; land use; Malawi; Indonesia; ECOSYSTEM SERVICES; INFORMATION; EXPERIENCE; BEHAVIOR; MARKETS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.12.007

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Payments for environmental services programs use direct incentives to improve the environmental impacts of private land use decisions. An auction offers an approach to efficiently allocating contracts among least-cost landholders, which can improve the overall cost-effectiveness of the approach. However, experiences with auctions in developing country settings are limited. We compare the results of two case studies that use auctions to allocate payments for environmental service contracts in Indonesia and Malawi. While the settings and the contracts differ, regularities in auction design allow comparisons and general lessons about the application of auctions to payments for environmental services programs. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1213 / 1223

页数：11

共 28 条

[1]

AJAYI OC, 2009, ENV HLTH SUBSAHARAN

[2] Predicting the supply of ecosystem services from agriculture [J].