Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives

被引：42

作者：

Bar-Isaac, Heski ^{[1
]}

Shapiro, Joel ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USA

[2] Univ Oxford, Said Business Sch, Oxford OX1 1HP, England

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2011年 / 101卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.101.3.120

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：120 / 124

页数：5

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