All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

被引：44

作者：

Blume, A

Heidhues, P

机构：

[1] Wissensch Zentrum Berlin Sozialforsch gGmbH WZB, D-10785 Berlin, Germany

[2] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Econ, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2004年 / 114卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

second-price sealed-bid auction; reserve price; uniqueness;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：170 / 177

页数：8

共 10 条

[1] EQUILIBRIA IN OPEN COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS [J].