An economist's guide to US v. Microsoft

被引:59
作者
Gilbert, RJ [1 ]
Katz, ML [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Ctr Telecommun & Digital Convergence, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.15.2.25
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze the central economic issues raised by U.S. v Microsoft. Network effects and economies of scale in applications programs created a barrier to entry for new operating system competitors, which the combination of Netscape Navigator and the Java programming language potentially could have lowered. Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 44
页数:20
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