Virtual implementation in backwards induction

被引:11
作者
Glazer, J
Perry, M
机构
[1] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,DEPT ECON,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
[2] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,CTR RAT,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1996.0057
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form mechanism introduced by Abreu and Matsushima (1992). We show that almost any social choice function can be virtually implemented via a finite sequential game of perfect information. The solution concept assumed is backwards induction. In particular, any social choice function that is virtually implementable via the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism is also virtually implementable by a sequential mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:27 / 32
页数:6
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