Theory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connections

被引:110
作者
Knobe, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Philosophy, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1016/j.tics.2005.06.011
中图分类号
B84 [心理学]; C [社会科学总论]; Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 030303 ; 04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
It is widely recognized that people sometimes use theory-of-mind judgments in moral cognition. A series of recent studies shows that the connection can also work in the opposite direction: moral judgments can sometimes be used in theory-of-mind cognition. Thus, there appear to be cases in which people's moral judgments actually serve as input to the process underlying their application of theory-of-mind concepts.
引用
收藏
页码:357 / 359
页数:3
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