Coase versus the Coasians

被引：247

作者：

Glaeser, E ^{[1
]}

Johnson, S

Shleifer, A

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2001年 / 116卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/00335530152466250

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Who should enforce laws or contracts: judges or regulators? Many Coasians, though not Coase himself, advocate judicial enforcement. We show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice. We then compare the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market. In the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market.

引用

页码：853 / 899

页数：47

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