Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving

被引:533
作者
DellaVigna, Stefano [1 ]
List, John A.
Malmendier, Ulrike
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
C93; D03; H41; IMPURE ALTRUISM; ECONOMICS; INCENTIVES; DONATIONS;
D O I
10.1093/qje/qjr050
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Every year, 90% of Americans give money to charities. Is such generosity necessarily welfare enhancing for the giver? We present a theoretical framework that distinguishes two types of motivation: individuals like to give, for example, due to altruism or warm glow, and individuals would rather not give but dislike saying no, for example, due to social pressure. We design a door-to-door fund-raiser in which some households are informed about the exact time of solicitation with a flyer on their doorknobs. Thus, they can seek or avoid the fund-raiser. We find that the flyer reduces the share of households opening the door by 9% to 25% and, if the flyer allows checking a Do Not Disturb box, reduces giving by 28% to 42%. The latter decrease is concentrated among donations smaller than $10. These findings suggest that social pressure is an important determinant of door-to-door giving. Combining data from this and a complementary field experiment, we structurally estimate the model. The estimated social pressure cost of saying no to a solicitor is $3.80 for an in-state charity and $1.40 for an out-of-state charity. Our welfare calculations suggest that our door-to-door fund-raising campaigns on average lower the utility of the potential donors.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 56
页数:56
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