The case for shareholder access to the ballot

被引：1

作者：

Bebchuk, LA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Program Corp Governance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

BUSINESS LAWYER | 2003年 / 59卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

The SEC is now considering a proposal to require some public companies to include in their proxy materials candidates for the board nominated by shareholders. Providing such shareholder access to the corporate ballot, I argue, would improve corporate governance. Analyzing each of the objections that have been raised against such shareholder access, I conclude that none of them provides a good basis for opposing shareholder access. The case for shareholder access is strong.

引用

页码：43 / +

页数：25

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