Chivalry and solidarity in ultimatum games

被引:228
作者
Eckel, CC
Grossman, PJ
机构
[1] Virginia Polytech Inst & State Univ, Dept Econ, Blacksburg, VA 24060 USA
[2] St Cloud State Univ, Dept Econ, St Cloud, MN 56301 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/ei/39.2.171
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We report the results of ultimatum game experiments designed to test for differences in the behavior of women and men. Women's proposals are on average more generous than men's, regardless of the sex of the partner and women respondents are more likely to accept an offer of a given amount, A given offer is more likely to be accepted if it comes from a woman; we term this result chivalry. Women paired with women almost never fail to reach an agreement; we term this result solidarity. Age, earnings, and race also significantly affect proposals and the rates of rejection.
引用
收藏
页码:171 / 188
页数:18
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