Executive retention and acquisition outcomes: A test of opposing views on the influence of organizational tenure

被引:27
作者
Bergh, DD [1 ]
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business Adm, Dept Management & Org, Ulhasnagar 16802, Maharashtra, India
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0149-2063(01)00110-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study considers the influence of retained acquired company top executives on the eventual outcome of corporate acquisitions. We test opposing views on how the organizational tenure of those executives could lead to the retention and divestiture of acquired companies. The Resource-based View (RBV) suggests that keeping acquired company top executives with longer organizational tenure will lead to more successful acquisition outcomes, as those executives have organization-specific knowledge that would facilitate effective implementation of the acquisition. By contrast, the Upper Echelons Perspective (UEP) suggests that retained top executives having short organizational tenure will lead to more successful outcomes, as they would have the adaptability to manage most effectively during the uncertainty and difficulty of the acquisition. Results of logistic regression analyses of 104 acquisitions followed over 5 years supported the RBV. Apparently, the benefits of long organizational tenure, such as more intimate understanding of the acquired company, lead to more successful outcomes than the benefits of short organizational tenure. The findings do not support the argument that drawbacks of long organizational tenure, such as commitment to the strategic status quo and rigidity, are detrimental after uncertainty and disruption. The results further suggest that one reason for the high frequency of acquisition failure might be because of the retention-and departures-of the wrong acquired company top executives. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:603 / 622
页数:20
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