Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments

被引:76
作者
Casari, Marco
Ham, John C.
Kagel, John H.
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[2] Univ So Calif, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
[3] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.97.4.1278
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much more susceptible to the winner's curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects. These selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects. Ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning.
引用
收藏
页码:1278 / 1304
页数:27
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