Monitoring: Which institutions matter?

被引:966
作者
Chen, Xia
Harford, Jarrad [1 ]
Li, Kai
机构
[1] Univ Washington, Sch Business, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
[2] Univ British Columbia, Sauder Sch Business, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
关键词
corporate governance; institutional investors; mergers and acquisitions; monitoring; trading;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.09.005
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Within a cost benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the subset of monitoring institutions. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:279 / 305
页数:27
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