Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: Evidence from the US states

被引:163
作者
Bohn, H [1 ]
Inman, RP [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF SANTA BARBARA,SANTA BARBARA,CA 93106
来源
CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY, VOL. 45, DECEMBER 1996: SPECIAL VOLUME: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL CHRIST | 1996年 / 45卷
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2231(96)00017-6
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Most states (Vermont is the exception) have constitutional or statutory limitations restricting their ability to run deficits in the state's general fund. Balanced budget Limitations may be either prospective (beginning-of-the-year) requirements or retrospective (end-of-the-year) requirements. Importantly, the state limits apply only to the general fund, leaving other funds (capital, pensions, social insurance) as potential sources for deficit financing. Do these general fund balanced-budget requirements Limit deficit financing? If so, which balanced-budget rules are most effective in constraining state deficit financing? Finally, how are state spending and taxation decisions affected by balanced-budget rules? Using budget data from a panel of 47 U.S. states for the period 1970-1991, the analysis finds that state end-of-the-year (not prospective) balance requirements do have significant positive effects on a state's general fund surplus. The surplus is accumulated through cuts in spending, not through tax increases. It is saved in a state ''rainy-day'' fund in anticipation of possible future general fund deficits. We find little evidence here that the constraints ''force'' deficits into other fiscal accounts.
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页码:13 / 76
页数:64
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