CPINDEX: Cyber-Physical Vulnerability Assessment for Power-Grid Infrastructures

被引:160
作者
Vellaithurai, Ceeman [1 ]
Srivastava, Anurag [1 ]
Zonouz, Saman [2 ]
Berthier, Robin [3 ]
机构
[1] Washington State Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Pullman, WA 99163 USA
[2] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA
[3] Univ Illinois, Informat Trust Inst, Urbana, IL 61820 USA
关键词
Cyber-physical security metrics; cyber-physical systems; intrusion detection systems; situational awareness;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2014.2372315
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
080906 [电磁信息功能材料与结构]; 082806 [农业信息与电气工程];
摘要
To protect complex power-grid control networks, power operators need efficient security assessment techniques that take into account both cyber side and the power side of the cyber-physical critical infrastructures. In this paper, we present CPINDEX, a security-oriented stochastic risk management technique that calculates cyber-physical security indices to measure the security level of the underlying cyber-physical setting. CPINDEX installs appropriate cyber-side instrumentation probes on individual host systems to dynamically capture and profile low-level system activities such as interprocess communications among operating system assets. CPINDEX uses the generated logs along with the topological information about the power network configuration to build stochastic Bayesian network models of the whole cyber-physical infrastructure and update them dynamically based on the current state of the underlying power system. Finally, CPINDEX implements belief propagation algorithms on the created stochastic models combined with a novel graph-theoretic power system indexing algorithm to calculate the cyber-physical index, i.e., to measure the security-level of the system's current cyber-physical state. The results of our experiments with actual attacks against a real-world power control network shows that CPINDEX, within few seconds, can efficiently compute the numerical indices during the attack that indicate the progressing malicious attack correctly.
引用
收藏
页码:566 / 575
页数:10
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