Evolutionary game analysis on the behavior strategies of power producers in renewable portfolio standard

被引：160

作者：

Zhao Xin-gang ^{[1
,2
]}

Ren Ling-zhi ^{[1
,2
]}

Zhang Yu-zhuo ^{[1
,2
]}

Wan Guan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] North China Elect Power Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

[2] Beijing Key Lab New Energy & Low Carbon Dev, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

ENERGY | 2018年 / 162卷

关键词：

Renewable portfolio standard; Tradable green certificates; Behavior strategies; Evolutionary game; TRADABLE GREEN CERTIFICATES; FEED-IN TARIFF; ELECTRICITY MARKET; UNITED-STATES; ENERGY; INDUSTRY; SYSTEM; POLICY; CHINA; UNCERTAINTY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.energy.2018.07.209

中图分类号：

O414.1 [热力学];

学科分类号：

070201 [理论物理];

摘要：

Renewable portfolio standard (RPS) plays a significant role in developing renewable energy. This study developed an evolution game model of power producers to analyze the symbiotic evolution between RPS and the electric producers' behavior strategies, and discuss the impacts of the key institutional parameters on the dynamic evolution process of electric producers. To verify the theoretical results, simulation experiments and sensitivity analysis were conducted with meaningful results: Trading Tradable Green certificates (TGC) could become the common belief of all power producers, with the scientific design of institutional parameters. An optimal quota, higher unit fine, lower transaction cost and marginal cost difference of green and thermal power contribute to improving the effectiveness of RPS. This study could provide some scientific recommendations for government to design and construct RPS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：505 / 516

页数：12

共 42 条

[1]

The effect of financial constraints, technological progress and long-term contracts on tradable green certificates [J].