Joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts

被引：29

作者：

Madajewicz, Malgosia ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, IRI, Palisades, NY 10964 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2011年 / 77卷 / 02期

关键词：

Joint liability; Peer monitoring; Credit rationing; Group loans; Individual loans; IMPERFECT INFORMATION; ADVERSE SELECTION; MICROFINANCE; INCENTIVES; MARKETS; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2008.01.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I offer an explanation for the coexistence of joint-liability and individual-liability microcredit contracts. I show that both contracts maximize welfare when credit is rationed due to limited liability, but for different borrowers. Borrowers monitor each other when liability is joint, while the lender monitors individual loans. Joint liability offers poorer borrowers larger loans with less monitoring effort than would have to be exerted by the lender. Individual liability offers the wealthier among credit-constrained borrowers larger loans even without monitoring. The theory explains why individual loans serve the wealthier among poor borrowers and are larger, and why businesses funded with individual loans grow more. (c) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：107 / 123

页数：17

共 33 条

[1] Using repayment data to test across models of joint liability lending [J].