Bad reputation

被引：128

作者：

Ely, JC ^{[1
]}

Välimäki, J

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Univ Southampton, Dept Econ, Southampton SO9 5NH, Hants, England

[3] Helsinki Sch Econ, Helsinki, Finland

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2003年 / 118卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/00335530360698423

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of the literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.

引用

页码：785 / 814

页数：30

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