Corporate ownership around the world

被引:5969
作者
La Porta, R [1 ]
Lopez-de-Silanes, F [1 ]
Shleifer, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/0022-1082.00115
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash Flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.
引用
收藏
页码:471 / 517
页数:47
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