Bringing the market inside the firm?

[1] SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE-MEASURES IN OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (04) : 1125 - 1156

[2] BAKER G, 2001, IN PRESS Q J EC

[3] THE EXISTENCE OF SELF-ENFORCING IMPLICIT CONTRACTS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (01) : 147 - 159

[4] Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration - A simple model [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1995, 28 (03) : 387 - 397

[5] THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OWNERSHIP - A THEORY OF VERTICAL AND LATERAL INTEGRATION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1986, 94 (04) : 691 - 719

[6] HALONEN M, 1994, REPUTATION ALLOCATIO

[7] PROPERTY-RIGHTS AND THE NATURE OF THE FIRM [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1990, 98 (06) : 1119 - 1158

[8] Hart Oliver., 1995, Firms, contracts, and financial structure

[9] The firm as a subeconomy [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 1999, 15 (01) : 74 - 102

[10] HOLMSTROM B, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P972

[1] SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE-MEASURES IN OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (04) : 1125 - 1156

[2] BAKER G, 2001, IN PRESS Q J EC

[3] THE EXISTENCE OF SELF-ENFORCING IMPLICIT CONTRACTS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (01) : 147 - 159

[4] Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration - A simple model [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1995, 28 (03) : 387 - 397

[5] THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OWNERSHIP - A THEORY OF VERTICAL AND LATERAL INTEGRATION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1986, 94 (04) : 691 - 719

[6] HALONEN M, 1994, REPUTATION ALLOCATIO

[7] PROPERTY-RIGHTS AND THE NATURE OF THE FIRM [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1990, 98 (06) : 1119 - 1158

[8] Hart Oliver., 1995, Firms, contracts, and financial structure

[9] The firm as a subeconomy [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 1999, 15 (01) : 74 - 102

[10] HOLMSTROM B, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P972