A note on efficient solutions for the linear bilevel programming problem

被引:4
作者
Soismaa, M
机构
[1] Helsinki Sch Econ & Business Adm, FIN-00101 Helsinki, Finland
[2] Int Inst Appl Syst Anal, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
关键词
bilevel programming; decision theory; efficient solution; bargaining;
D O I
10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00405-0
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The solutions of linear bilevel programming problems frequently are non-Pareto-optimal. The potential increase in payoffs generated by Pareto improvements makes it worthwhile to consider methods with which to move the solution to the efficient frontier. Bargaining models offer one class of solutions, which, contrary to the original non-cooperative, sequential decision-making situation, however, assume cooperation. We make an attempt to maintain the original power structure by introducing the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:427 / 431
页数:5
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