The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development

被引:1856
作者
Xu, Chenggang [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
ECONOMIC-GROWTH; FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION; VILLAGE ENTERPRISES; POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION; TRANSITION ECONOMIES; REGIONAL DISPARITIES; INCOME INEQUALITY; STATE ENTERPRISES; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; PUBLIC-GOODS;
D O I
10.1257/jel.49.4.1076
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve the "China puzzle," this paper analyzes China's institution-a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas subnational governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. China's reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure.
引用
收藏
页码:1076 / 1151
页数:76
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