Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks

被引：13

作者：

Berninghaus, SK

Schwalbe, U

机构：

[1] UNIV KARLSRUHE,DEPT ECON,KARLSRUHE,GERMANY

[2] UNIV MANNHEIM,DEPT ECON,MANNHEIM,GERMANY

来源：

JOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS | 1996年 / 6卷 / 03期

关键词：

conventions; evolutionary games; interaction structure; automata networks;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01193635

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper deals with-the evolution of conventions in a finite population of boundedly rational players. We apply methods from the theory of automata networks to analyze the effects of different interaction structures. It is shown that the size of the reference group for each player has an important impact on the evolutionary stability of a particular convention, and that the interaction structure crucially determines the distribution of conventions in the population.

引用

页码：297 / 312

页数：16

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