How access pricing and entry interact

被引:60
作者
Cave, M [1 ]
Vogelsang, I
机构
[1] Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Ctr Management, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[2] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA
关键词
access pricing; facilities-based competition; regulation;
D O I
10.1016/j.telpol.2003.08.004
中图分类号
G2 [信息与知识传播];
学科分类号
05 ; 0503 ;
摘要
The paper reviews the preceeding theoretical and econometric analysis, and the case study of the Netherlands. It suggests that entrants' strategies will be influenced by the level of access prices and on the degree of investment in infrastructure which entrants have to make to be eligible to purchase interconnection services at wholesale prices. Entrants will typically invest first in replicable assets, and then progress to less replicable ones-although this will also depend upon their initial endowments. This suggests that entry may best be encouraged initially by low access prices, with those prices possibly increasing over time as assets are replicated. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:717 / 727
页数:11
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