Air-rail cooperation: Partnership level, market structure and welfare implications

被引:58
作者
Jiang, Changmin [1 ,4 ]
D'Alfonso, Tiziana [2 ,4 ]
Wan, Yulai [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Manitoba, Asper Sch Business, Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2, Canada
[2] Sapienza Univ Roma, Dept Comp Control & Management Engn Antonio Ruber, Via Ariosto 25, I-00185 Rome, Italy
[3] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Logist & Maritime Studies, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Univ Manitoba, Transport Inst, Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2, Canada
关键词
Airline; Rail; Cooperation; Domestic partnership; International partnership; HIGH-SPEED RAIL; AIRLINE INDUSTRY; TRANSPORT COMPETITION; AIRPORT CAPACITY; ALLIANCES; EUROPE; PRICE; INTEGRATION; CONGESTION; SIMULATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.trb.2017.01.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We build a theoretical model to study different air-rail cooperation scenarios. We investigate two possible air-rail partnerships between a rail operator and either a domestic airline or a foreign airline. When a partnership is formed, an investment to improve the air rail connecting service is allowed at a cost before the service is launched. We find that the cooperation level, the equilibrium partnership scenarios when air-rail cooperation is exclusive or non-exclusive, as well as the comparisons of social welfare under different partnership scenarios, all depend on the pre-investment quality of air-rail service compared with the quality of air-air service. We further apply our model to the real-life case of Strasbourg-Paris-Dubai market, showing that other factors, such as price sensitivity of demand, horizontal differentiation between air and rail, and asymmetries in partnership investment costs, also affect cooperation level. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:461 / 482
页数:22
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